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* The Honorable D. Michael Fisher assumed senior status on 
February 1, 2017.  
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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In this appeal, Paul McKernan contends that, because 
of the egregious advice given him by his counsel, he was 
deprived of the right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.  
He asserts that the judge in his murder trial was so concerned 
over what she considered to be “slanderous,” “hurtful,” and 
“terrible things” written about her on a website that she lost 
her ability to be impartial.  He further asserts that his counsel, 
unlike any competent counsel, failed to recognize this loss of 
impartiality and, in doing so, deprived him of the effective 
assistance of counsel that the Constitution guarantees.  We 
agree with the latter argument and, for this reason, we will 
remand this case to the District Court with instructions to 
grant McKernan’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless 
within 60 days of the date of remand, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania shall decide to retry Paul McKernan. 
 
I. 
In July 1998, after a bench trial in the Philadelphia 
County Court of Common Pleas, McKernan was convicted of 
first degree murder in the death of Mark Gibson.  McKernan 
and Gibson were former roommates.  McKernan was found to 
have killed Gibson with a baseball bat during an argument 
outside McKernan’s home.  A witness to the events, Joseph 
Rodgers, did not see McKernan strike Gibson but did hear “a 
loud thump,” after which he saw Gibson lying on the ground, 
bleeding profusely.  McKernan told Rodgers that he hit 
Gibson in the chest, a statement contradicted by a defense 
witness who testified that he saw McKernan hit Gibson in the 




A medical examiner testified that Gibson died after 
being hit behind the ear with a blunt instrument, such as an 
aluminum baseball bat.  McKernan admitted to hitting Gibson 
with the bat but claimed that it was in self-defense and that 
Gibson’s head injuries arose from the impact of Gibson 
hitting his head on the curb.  The trial judge, Judge Lisa 
Richette, found McKernan guilty of first degree murder and 
sentenced him to a mandatory sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole. 
 
 On the second day of the bench trial, after the 
Commonwealth had rested but before the defense had started 
its case-in-chief, Judge Richette called the victim’s mother, 
Beatrice Gibson, and his brother, David Gibson, into her 
robing room, along with the assistant district attorney, Mark 
Gilson, and defense counsel, Fred Harrison.  McKernan was 
not present for the ensuing meeting, but the meeting was 
transcribed by the court reporter.   
 
 It is difficult to convey in excerpts the inappropriate 
nature of this lengthy conference.  It is even more difficult to 
understand why defense counsel Harrison failed to object to 
the proceedings or to move for the judge’s recusal at any 
point during the conference.  Harrison himself noted in later 
testimony that he had never before or since been part of a 
similar conference.   
 
 The judge began the conversation by saying that she 
was “very disturbed” after finding a website that the Gibsons 
had created, containing criticism of the judge.1  The judge 
said to Mrs. Gibson that the site was “vicious and unfair” and 
                                                 
1 J.A. at 249. 
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that the judge did not “want to hear this case if” Mrs. Gibson 
was “unhappy with” her.2  The judge had a printed copy of 
the website and read from portions of it.  The website 
described an ongoing controversy between the judge and the 
actor Charlton Heston, who had criticized the judge as being 
soft on crime and referred to her as “Let ‘em Loose Lisa.”  
The judge read a passage from the website stating “Lisa 
Richette is a bleeding heart judge that often sympathizes with 
murderers and other violent criminals and gives them light 
sentences,” which the judge characterized as “a total lie.”3  
The judge then accused the Gibsons of writing “dreadful, 
slanderous things about [her]” throughout the website.4 
 
 Despite the judge’s anger caused by the website, she 
sought the Gibsons’s approval of her actions in the trial.  She 
characterized the case as “a horrible, horrible murder,”5 told 
the Gibsons that she “just want[ed] to make sure that you 
folks are happy with me,”6 and told the assistant district 
attorney she didn’t “want these people – they have already 
been hurt enough, and I don’t want them to have this case 
heard by a Judge in whom they have no faith.”7  She told the 
Gibsons, “You’re very fortunate, I’ll tell you what, you have 
a witness, you have Mr. Rodgers”8 because, “[m]any of these 
murders occur with nobody willing to come forward and say I 
                                                 
2 Id.  
3 Id. at 253. 
4 Id. at 259. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 275. 
7 Id. at 260. 
8 Id. at 279. 
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saw it.”9  After being assured by the Gibsons that they were 
“satisfied” with Judge Richette presiding over McKernan’s 
trial, she concluded, “I don’t want to open the Daily News 
tomorrow and read the usual B.S.”10 
 
 Throughout this conversation, McKernan’s defense 
counsel stood mute.  Indeed, it was Assistant District 
Attorney Gilson who eventually asked McKernan’s counsel if 
he was concerned about the conference, to which Harrison 
replied, “The only input I have is I guess I need to apprise 
[McKernan] of what is going on.”11  After making this 
statement, Harrison did not request that the meeting be 
recessed, but rather left Gilson, the judge, and the Gibsons 
alone together in the robing room while Harrison conferred 
with his client.  As Harrison left, the judge said, “Go ahead, 
I’ll just talk to [the family] generally.”12   
 
 In Harrison’s absence, David Gibson, the victim’s 
brother, who was primarily responsible for creating the 
offending website, offered to allow the judge to “red line” 
anything she did not approve of from the site and write her 
own thoughts about victimology, which David Gibson would 
post in the judge’s “defense.”13  The judge agreed to do so.  
The judge told Mrs. Gibson that she (the judge) would have 
acted similarly if the same events had happened to her son, 
                                                 
9 Id. at 280. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 283. 
12 Id. 
13 Id.at  284. 
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noting that “we’re all mothers here.”14  She also told Mrs. 
Gibson that they were “very lucky” that they were assigned 
Mr. Gilson, the assistant district attorney, and that “Gilson is 
one of the best D.A.s in the world.”  The Gibsons then left the 
judge’s chambers.15 
 
After conferring with McKernan, Harrison returned to 
the robing room and told the judge and Gilson that his client 
had “concerns” because the website said the judge was “a 
lenient judge” and “the fact that you mentioned Mr. Rogers 
and his testimony, he thinks that you may be constrained to 
lean over backwards,” to prove Mrs. Gibson wrong and the 
judge would not give McKernan a fair trial. 16  Gilson had the 
same concerns.   Harrison said that McKernan was unsure 
what to do.17  Harrison indicated that he had advised 
McKernan to continue before Judge Richette.  He further 
noted that he and Gilson believed what “might solve the 
problem would be if we brought Mr. McKernan back and let 
him talk to you just like you talked to” the victim’s family.18 
 
McKernan was brought to the robing room where the 
judge told him that she had discussed the website with the 
victim’s family, that the family was now satisfied with her 
because they had been assigned Mr. Gilson, and that the 
victim’s family wanted the judge to continue to hear the 
case.19  She told McKernan that the conversation was “not 
                                                 
14 Id. at 286. 
15 Id.   
16 Id. at 287. 
17 Id. at 288. 
18 Id. at 287. 
19 Id. at 290. 
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going to influence [her] thinking at all about this” and that she 
would “listen to your side of the case very carefully and . . . 
reach a verdict.”20  She also stated she would “try and pray to 
God that I be fair to you.”21  Although McKernan stated that 
he believed that the judge could be fair, Gilson seemed to 
sense some doubts in McKernan’s demeanor, causing him to 
ask the judge to allow McKernan more time to speak with 
Harrison before continuing the colloquy.22   
 
 After this second private conversation, Harrison stated 
that he “had an opportunity . . . to speak with [his] client by 
himself, and . . . indicated to him – reiterated to him what 
Your Honor has said to him previously.  Mr. McKernan has 
indicated to me that he thinks that you can be fair.”23  Gilson 
asked whether anyone had forced McKernan to accept Judge 
Richette and if anyone had threatened or promised him 
anything, to which McKernan replied no.24  The bench trial 
then resumed, with McKernan putting on his defense, after 
which the judge found McKernan guilty of First Degree 
Murder. 
 
McKernan appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion.25  
Among the grounds of the appeal were the claims that “the 
trial judge erred in failing to recuse herself” based on the 
                                                 
20 Id. at 291. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 293-294. 
23 Id. at 294. 
24 Id. at 295. 
25 Commonwealth v. McKernan, 776 A.2d 1007 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2001) (Table). 
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robing room conference and that Harrison was ineffective for 
failing to move for recusal.  The Superior Court rejected both 
arguments, finding “neither trial court error nor ineffective 
assistance of counsel on this record.” 
 
McKernan petitioned for post-conviction relief, which 
the trial court denied.  On appeal, McKernan raised a single 
issue:  whether McKernan’s “decision, mid-trial, to refuse the 
Trial Court’s offer to recuse itself” was a “knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary decision and under all the 
circumstances was a knowing waiver of a constitutional right 
at the time that it was made and were trial counsel, appellate 
counsel and post conviction counsel all ineffective for failing 
to raise and brief this very precise issue.”  The Superior Court 
found that the issue had been previously litigated.  In the 
alternative, the Superior Court analyzed the merits of 
McKernan’s motion for post-conviction relief, finding that 
habeas relief was not warranted.  For both reasons, the 
Superior Court dismissed the petition.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court declined review. 
 
McKernan then filed a pro se federal habeas petition 
raising, among other grounds, the question of whether “[t]rial 
counsel rendered IAC [ineffective assistance of counsel] by 
failing to challenge whether the petitioner entered a 
voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver regarding the 
recusal of the trial judge.”  A Magistrate Judge recommended 
denial of the habeas petition, to which McKernan, now 
represented by counsel, objected. 
 
The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on 
November 24, 2008.  After the hearing, the District Court 
denied the petition but granted a Certificate of Appealability 
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on the issue of whether McKernan had made a substantial 
showing that the trial judge’s failure to recuse violated the 
due process requirement of a fair trial by a fair tribunal and 
whether he might be actually innocent of first degree murder, 
if not some degree of homicide.  A panel of this Court 
expanded the Certificate of Appealability to include the issue 
of “whether the district court erred in denying [the] claim that 
trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to seek and 
secure relief for the trial court’s (alleged) bias.”  We will 




 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; we have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Our review of the District 
Court’s opinion is plenary.26  In reviewing a habeas petition 
under § 2254, we must first be satisfied that the claims have 
been exhausted, and have not been procedurally defaulted.27  
If these procedural requirements are satisfied, a habeas 
petition may be granted with respect to a claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits by a state court only if the state 
court proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based 
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”28   
                                                 
26 Showers v. Beard, 635 F.3d 625, 628 (3d Cir. 2011). 
27 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 




 Under § 2254(d)(1), “[a] state court decision is an 
unreasonable application . . . if the court identifies the correct 
governing legal rule from the Supreme Court’s cases but 
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.”29  
This is a high standard, since “[i]t is not enough that a federal 
habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, 
is left with a firm conviction that the state court was 
erroneous.”30  Instead, “[t]he state court’s application of 
clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable 
before a federal court may grant the writ.”31 
 
 Here, McKernan has not procedurally defaulted his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and has properly 
exhausted it in state court.  Although the Superior Court 
dismissed McKernan’s Strickland claim under Pennsylvania’s 
“previous litigation rule,” we have held that claims resolved 
under this rule are not procedurally defaulted for purposes of 
federal habeas corpus.32  Similarly, we have held that claims 
                                                 
29 Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
30 Rountree v. Balicki, 640 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
31 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
32 Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 330, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (opinion of Hardiman, J.) (collecting cases).  The per 
curiam opinion in Boyd expressly rested on Judge Hardiman’s 
analysis of procedural default and exhaustion.  Id. at 332 
(“For the reasons given in Part III of [Judge Hardiman’s] 
opinion, we conclude Boyd's claim was properly exhausted 
and has not been procedurally defaulted.”). 
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dismissed under the previous litigation rule are properly 
exhausted.33  Accordingly, McKernan has satisfied the 
procedural requirements of a federal habeas petition, and we 
may consider the merits of his argument. 
 
 McKernan argues that the state courts unreasonably 
applied Supreme Court precedent as to whether McKernan’s 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek Judge 
Richette’s recusal and for advising McKernan not to seek 
recusal.  Because the Superior Court considered the merits of 
McKernan’s claims, and did not rest solely on the previous 
litigation rule, we treat its findings with the deference 
required by § 2254(d).34  The state court and the District 
Court correctly identified the appropriate Supreme Court 
precedent to apply as Strickland v. Washington.35  Strickland 
established the familiar two prong test for evaluating 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, under which the 
petitioner must first show that the counsel’s performance was 
deficient and, second, that the deficient performance was 
prejudicial to the defendant.36  To meet the first prong, 
counsel’s performance must fall “below an objective standard 
of reasonableness considering all the circumstances.”37  
Counsel’s performance is deficient only “when counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
                                                 
33 Staruh v. Superintendent Cambridge Springs SCI, et al., 
827 F.3d 251, 256 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016). 
34 See Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 319-21 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
35 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
36 Id. at 687. 
37 Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 102. 
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‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.”38 
 
III. 
 The deference due state court merits judgments under 
§ 2254(d) and Strickland is significant, but it “does not imply 
abandonment or abdication of judicial review.”39  We have no 
trouble holding that, in the unique circumstances of this case, 
counsel’s performance in failing to move for recusal of Judge 
Richette fell far below the minimal standards of competence 
in the profession and the state court’s failure to recognize this 
incompetence was an unreasonable application of the 
Strickland factors. 
 
 Counsel in this matter had tried many cases before 
Judge Richette and described her as a “colorful jurist.”  He 
testified at the hearing before the District Court that, although 
he had never experienced a situation similar to the robing 
room conference, he believed that a bench trial before Judge 
Richette offered the best option for his client.  The District 
Court found that Harrison’s decision was strategic in nature 
and was at least arguably rational.  We disagree. 
 
 The right to a “fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process” and derives directly from the 
Constitution.40  While a defendant is capable of waiving 
many rights, including the right to a jury, the absolute 
                                                 
38 McBride v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale, 687 F.3d 92, 
102 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original). 
39 Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
40 In re: Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
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minimum standard for a constitutional trial is “an impartial 
trial by jury.”41  The importance of a fair tribunal is so etched 
into the bedrock of the American judicial system that few 
courts have even found a need to address it.  The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, simply observed that 
certain procedural requirements must be followed, noting that 
“if the parties stipulated to trial by 12 orangutans the 
defendant’s conviction would be invalid notwithstanding his 
consent, because some minimum of civilized procedure is 
required by community feeling regardless of what the 
defendant wants or is willing to accept.”42  Similarly, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s 
holding that a defendant waived his right to an impartial jury 
by failing to object to a juror who lied during voir dire, 
especially in light of subsequent events that revealed the juror 
“was actually biased against Defendants.”43 
 
 Considering the myriad procedural safeguards in place 
to avoid the seating of even one biased juror, out of twelve, it 
is inconceivable that, during a bench trial when the judge is 
the sole factfinder, a trial may proceed when that judge is 
biased.  To do so is to conduct a trial before an unfair 
tribunal, violating the fundamental requirement for an 
acceptable trial.  We therefore hold today that the right to an 
impartial trial extends to a bench trial, and that such right 
cannot be waived by a defendant. 
 
The Commonwealth asserts, and the state courts found, 
                                                 
41 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). 
42 United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985). 
43 United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83, 120 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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that Judge Richette did not show herself to be “actually 
biased” against McKernan and, consequently, counsel was 
not ineffective for failing to move for recusal.44  The state 
courts applied the wrong constitutional test and compounded 
the error by finding that counsel was not ineffective.  The 
Supreme Court has held that allegations of bias rise to the 
level of a constitutional deprivation when there is the 
“probability of unfairness” and there exists “a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the 
accused.”45  As an example, in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 
two pro se defendants directed near constant abuse at a state 
trial judge until the trial judge held them in contempt.46  The 
Supreme Court held that the judge, as the victim of the 
contemnor’s outbursts, was too close to the proceedings to be 
impartial enough to make the relevant contempt findings.47   
                                                 
44 Because McKernan’s claim of ineffective assistance is 
premised on the alleged bias of Judge Richette, we must make 
a threshold inquiry as to whether there were grounds to 
believe that Judge Richette was biased; counsel would not be 
ineffective for failing to move for recusal absent some 
perceived partiality.  However, this threshold inquiry does not 
necessarily support the existence of an independent due 
process claim.  A due process claim lies where a judge would 
have been required to recuse herself.  An ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, on the other hand, may lie where 
counsel fails to file a motion for discretionary recusal for 
which there are good grounds. 
45 In re: Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
46 400 U.S. 455, 460–62 (1971). 




 The Supreme Court held that the judge in Mayberry 
was subjected to “highly personal aspersions” and “[i]nsults 
of that kind [that] are apt to strike at the most vulnerable and 
human qualities of a judge’s temperament.”48  Here, we know 
that the Gibsons’ websites struck “at the most vulnerable and 
human qualities of”49 Judge Richette’s temperament through 
the robing room conference transcript.  In Mayberry, the 
Supreme Court noted that “a judge, vilified as was this 
Pennsylvania judge, necessarily becomes embroiled in a 
running, bitter controversy” and that “[n]o one so cruelly 
slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment 
necessary for fair adjudication.”50  In the instant matter, Judge 
Richette admitted to her belief that she had been slandered by 
the victim’s family and indicated that she was determined to 
prove them wrong. 
 
 In a case such as McKernan’s, where the defense 
theory of the case was at least partially based on arguing a 
lesser degree of culpability, Judge Richette’s actions would 
have caused any competent attorney to seek recusal 
immediately.51  Judge Richette offered the victim’s family in 
a case in progress before her an opportunity to seek her 
recusal.  She repeatedly implied that the assistant district 
attorney was the Gibsons’ attorney, when he in fact had no 
responsibility to the family of the victim, but rather to all of 
                                                 
48 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
49 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50 Id. at 465. 
51 Cf. Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 142 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to strike an 
obviously biased venire panel). 
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the people of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Most 
strikingly, Judge Richette sought repeatedly to assure the 
Gibson family that she was not “Let ‘em Loose Lisa,” a judge 
who was incapable of issuing harsh decisions. 
 
 As McKernan recognized, but McKernan’s counsel did 
not, a finding that McKernan was guilty of some offense 
involving a lower standard of culpability would play directly 
into the narrative the Gibsons had published on their website:  
the caricature of “Let ‘em Loose Lisa Strikes Again!”  While 
McKernan’s counsel’s belief that Judge Richette was the best 
option for his client at the beginning of trial may have been a 
reasonable strategic decision, by the time Judge Richette held 
the robing room conference and revealed herself to be 
actively concerned with the her image on the internet and the 
victim’s family’s perception of her, any competent attorney 
would have realized that the strategy had to be revised. 
 
 Indeed, it appears that if McKernan had had no 
counsel at all, he would have made the decision to seek 
recusal.  He expressed his concerns to his attorney, only to 
have his attorney inexplicably talk him out of those concerns, 
even going so far as to refer to his client’s very valid issues as 
a “problem” to be solved.  If counsel is ineffective only where 
his conduct was so deficient as to render his client de facto 
without counsel, McKernan’s counsel may have been worse:  
he convinced his client to proceed before a tribunal that 
objectively had the appearance of bias against him.  He 
advised his client to proceed before a court that was 
structurally deficient, something no competent attorney would 
ever do.  Under § 2254, where “[t]he question is whether 
there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 
18 
 
Strickland’s deferential standard,”52 the answer here is “No.”  
Consequently, McKernan’s claim fulfills the first prong of 
Strickland. 
 
 Strickland’s second prong is easier to fulfill.  To show 
prejudice, a petitioner need only “show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”53  This standard “is less demanding than the 
preponderance standard.”54  Here, the standard is easily met. 
 
 As noted above, McKernan’s defense centered on the 
degree of his culpability.  McKernan’s argument was that he 
had struck Gibson in self-defense and Gibson died when his 
head hit the curb.  In view of Judge Richette’s sensitivity to 
criticism for being lenient, it would not appear likely that she 
would now accept McKernan’s defense of a lesser degree of 
homicide.  There is evidence in the record from which an 
impartial judge could have found a lesser degree of homicide.  
McKernan’s counsel himself admitted to the District Court 
that he was quite surprised by the verdict, thinking that there 
was virtually no chance under the facts of the case that 
McKernan would be found guilty of first degree murder.  
Thus, there is a reasonable probability that if McKernan’s 
counsel had been effective and moved for recusal, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different.  The second 
Strickland prong is met here. 
                                                 
52 McBride, 687 F.3d at 103 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011)). 
53 Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal 





 Given this holding that petitioner met both prongs of 
the Strickland inquiry, it is unnecessary for us to reach the 
parties’ other arguments, and we express no opinion as to 
their validity.   
 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the decision 
of the District Court and remand with instructions to grant the 
petition for habeas corpus unless, within 60 days of the 
remand, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decides to retry 
the charges against McKernan. 
